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Introduction
In recent years, especially since the discovery of North
Sea oil and gas, the number of Scots dedicated to the idea
of a Scotland independent of the United Kingdom has increased
tremendously.

Many, on both sides of the independence de

bate, have looked back, therefore, to the event which origi
nally made Scotland a part of the United Kingdom, namely the
Act of Union of 1707.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the circumstances
involved in the enactment of the union was the opposition
to the measure of the Scottish public.

Historians continue

to disagree on the myriad factors influencing the Scottish
decision to negotiate for union, but they are, nonetheless,

ani�GUS

in aeclar:ng that it was not a popular measure.
, b

1700, Scotland was re cty t5 b

in l603, and throughout the seventeenth century, both coun
tries had been governed by the same sov r 'gn,
tatives of the House of Stuart; but,
0£

the r pr

n

except for the sharing

the same executive, all other political institutions had

remained separate.

In a

ord, tho .gh

h

king, Scotland and England had existed as seoarate and sov

)

ereign political entiti s.
The problems caused the Scots by this personal union

iii
of the crowns were many, so many in fact that, by the end
of the seventeenth century, the undeniable majority of them
were anxious for a redefinition of the ties which held them
to England in what had been an inferior position.

Westmin

ster and the crown were also ready for a change in the rela
.tionship, but they desired even closer ties.

England's goal

was to consolidate control over Scottish national politics
by incorporating a proportionally small nlllT'�er of Scottish
representatives into the Westminster Parliament.

Toward this

end, the southerners, in 1705, legislated the Alien Act which
forced the Scots, through the application of economic sanc
tions, into bargaining for union.
historians are agreed.

On this point, too, modern

But the �uestion to be addressed

in this paper, one which has provoked considerable contro
versy in modern scholarly circles, is precisely what it was
in the end that prompted the Scots to acquiesce in the plans
the English had made for them:

why did they accept the Act

of Union, knowing full well that it was not an amalgamation
of equal peoples, that Englishmen felt no special sympathy
for particular Scottish needs, and that political union
meant the surrender of their nation's cherished independence?
Various answers, representing several schools of thought,
have been suggested.

The classical Whig interpretation, rep

resented best in the writings of G. M. Trevelyan and G. S.
Pryde, suggests that credit should be given the statesmen of
the day who rose above public opinion for the benefit of the

two countries.
.
1

iv

Until recently, the prevailing explan2�ion

had been that the Scottish legislators were won over to the
cause of union by expectations of a commercially prosperous
2
future.
In the past two decades, however, emphasis has
been placed on the role of personal ambition and factional
· voting within the Edinburgh Parliament in the final sessions
leading to the ratification of the union in 1707.

Propon

ents of this view hold that 0,ueen Anne's most trusted ser
vants in the parliament of Scotland orchestrated the creation
of a majority of legislators favorable to a complete in
corporation of the two kingdoms in the expectation of future
.

preferment in th e new regime.

3

This paper returns the focus to economics.

Pathetically

poor throughout her independent history, badgered and bullied
by her militarily stronger, more populous and wealthier neigh
bor, Scotland, after four-hundred years of unequal competi
tion in peace and in war, ultimately would surrender to grim
practicality by exchanging her valiantly earned freedom for
promised free trade and commercial intercourse everywhere
within the formerly exclusive English Empire.

What follows

1G. M. Trevelyan, Ramillies and the Union with Scqtland
(London: Longmans, Green and Co.:-T914); G. S. _Pryde, The
(London_:_
Treaty of Union of Scotland and Enqland, 1707.
Nelson,1950.
2P. Hume Brown, The Legislative Union of England and
Scotland ·(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); � C. Smout-,
Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707 (Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd-,-1963)___ 3P. w. J. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978); W. Ferguson,
Scotland's Relations with England: A Survey to 1707 (Edin
burgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd.,-1977). - --

V

in the body of this work is the history of that unequal
struggle as it unfolded in the seventeenth century.

Focus

ing on the consistent economic slights suffered at the hands
of the English, the paper will demonstrate that, above all
else, considerations of a commercial nature eventually
forced upon Scotland's political leaders the unwelcome rea
lization that the nation's viability depended upon a fuller
partnership with England.

/
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CEAPTER I
Two Kinqdoms Under One Crown, 1603-1707
The seventeenth century witnessed monumental changes in
Anglo-Scottish relations.

The number and variety of politi

cal ties between England and Scotland increased, but there
remained basic differences between the two which continued
to cause problems.

The major variances were the tremendous

disparities in the.population and wealth of the two states.
Scotland, by the end of the century, had only one million
people to England's five million.

Yet, the comparison in

terms of wealth was even more discomfiting for Scots; as
measured by land tax, customs and excise, the ratio was forty
4
to one in England's favor.
Nonetheless, this presented few
problems as long as each respected the independence and sov
ereignty of the other.

However, the situation was compli

cated by the ascendance of James VI, king of Scotland, to

the throne of England in 1603. 5

Prior to 1603, the Stuarts had ruled in the northern
kingdom and the Tudors in the southern.

When, upon the death

of Elizabeth Tudor, James VI of Scotland became James I of
4T. c. Smout, A History of the Scottish People, 15601830 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 216.

5His claim to the English throne originated in the mar
riage of his great-grandfather James IV to Margaret Tudor,
elder daughter of England's Henry VII, in 1503.

2
England, he initiated 104 years of Stuart rule over both
countries, a period known thereafter as the "union of crowns."
It was by no means, however, a union of the nations.

Each

state retained its political independence in the form of na
tional legislatures at Westminster and Edinburgh.

Problems

,arose because of the inability of the monarch to guide both
legislatures in a compatible direction.

When genuine con

flicts of interest arose, as they did frequently, the sov
ereign was forced to throw his influence with one or the
other.

Because the imbalances in population and affluence

favored England, it was natural for the Stuarts to place
English interests first when the need arose.

Such an arrange-

ment was always tenuous at best, but recurring problems solved
at Scotland's expense increased Scottish resentment towards
the union of crowns throughout the century.
This is not to say that the newly-wrought connection
had no beneficial effect on Scotland.

One advantage for the

northerners was the reduction of factional violence in their
country.

With the added prestige and power of the English

throne, James was better able to mete out ·punishments and
rewards for rejection or support of his policies.

In this

way, some measure of tranquility was imposed on the Scottish
.
6 As the authority of the central government incountryside.
creased in Scotland, there was less need for noble families
6srnout
,
pp. 106-113.

A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830,

3

and their private armies to maintain the peace.

The money

and the time spent on. retaining fighting men were gradually
reallocated to estate improvement and other commercial en
deavors.7
Scottish trade at the outset of the seventeenth century
consisted almost entirely 0£ the import of manufactured goods
which were exchanged for such exports as fish, untreated hides
8
and sk.ins.
Th e Scots carried on a limited amount of commerce with the Baltic states, Spain and England, though their
principle trading associates were the Dutch and the French.
The former received hides, cloth and skins in return for soap,
corn and hardware, while the latter bartered salt and wine
(the traditional drink of the lairds) for herring, which was
so plentiful that, as one wit would have it, the Scots were
convinced that their abundance of fish was heaven's compen
sation for the country's lack of sunshine.9 Be that as it
may, fishing ip the seventeenth century never acquired the
importance that it deserved.

Lack of capital and of entre

preneurial ability kept almost all industries, including
fishing, on a rudimentary scale.
7 Ibid., p. 101.

This was not because

8Gordon Marshall, Presby
teries and Profits, Calvinism
and the Development of Canitalism inScotland, 1560-1707.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1980), pp. 130-131.
9
S. G. E. Lythe and J. Butt, An Economic History of
Scotland 1100-1939. (Glasgow: John Donald Publishers Ltd.,
1975), p. 52.

4

(

Edinburgh did not support cow�ercial ventures; on the contrary,
the northern government was extremely aware that the nation's
reliance on imported goods had to be reduced and domestic pro
duction stimulated.

This is evident from legislation passed
l
.
·
wi'th the goa1 of increasing
the country ' s capi'ta1. O The c1oth
'industry, for instance, was encouraged by Parliament to erect
factories in 1641 and 1681,11 and it was further supported
12
by an act in 1701 prohibiting the import of foreign cloth.

Manufacture was especially encouraged because the sale of
Scottish products abroad would have brought much needed cur
rency into the country, while additionally it was hoped that
·
13
''many poore people & idle persones" would be set to work.
Legislation was ineffective because, as noted above, the
nation lacked capital and entrepreneurial skill.

Undaunted,

the Edinburgh legislators continued to pass supportive measures throughout the century.

s. G. E. Lythe provides a

most apt description of the situation:

"If acts could have
14
produced oats, Scotland would have been a well-fed land."
10R. H. Campbell, "The Law and the Joint-Stock Company
in Scotland'' from Peter L. Payne, ed., Studies in Scottish
Business History (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966(, p. l36.
11Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, c. Innes and T.

Thornson-;-'ed'S: (Edinburgh, 1814-1817), V; 441; VII, 348.
Hereafter cited as A. P. S.
12Ibid., XI, 190.

13Ibid., VII, 261.

14Lythe and Butt, Economic History of Scotland, p. 24.

5

With sufficient time and continued government support, the
accumulation of capital in Scotland was likely; but, the
first major disadvantages of the union of crowns surfaced
to disrupt Scottish commerce during the Puritan Interregnum
of 1649-1660.
Trouble began in the reign of Charles I, the son and
heir of James I, when the former attempted to foist a revised
Prayer Book, uniformity of service, and episcopalianism in
general on the Presbyterian Church of Scotland in the 1630's.
The reaction of many of his northern subjects was to sign a
National Covenant denouncing the changes he had made and
raise an army to defend the faith.

The Civil War which en

sued led to Charles' defeat and capture in May, 1646.
Charles' Puritan English subjects had joined the Scots in
resisting their king's Anglican tendencies,and it was the
Puritans who controlled the English Parliament which finally

arranged for Charles' trial and execution in January, 1649. 15
Charles' death temporarily ended the union of crowns,
but within the week the Scots had crowned the late monarch's
son as Charles II.

The ensuing fight to place the new Scot

tish king on the English throne lasted until 1651, when
Oliver Cromwell defeated the Scots at Worcester and in the
following year incorporated Scotland into the republican
Commonwealth as an equal partner with England, Ireland and
15George s. Pryde, Scotland from_l603 to the Present
� (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), pp. 8-10.

t '.

6

1

,-

the Enqlish colonies.16

Naturally, political power was mo

nopolized by the English Puritans at Westrninister, but free
trade was established between the members.
This should have beneritted Scottish traders; however,
war had taken a heavy toll on northern pronerty and hard cur
rency, thus limiting_the amount of capital available for the
expansion of markets.

Not only were new markets out of the

Scots' reach, but their old markets began to shrink as well
due to what was to become a recurring problem of Anglo
Scottish relatio�s.

As Professor William Ferguson notes:

"Overseas trade turned largely on foreign policy, but for
eign policy was a luxury Scotland no longer enjoyed." 17

The

Commonwealth union slowed Scottish trade to the Dutch and
French to a trickle because the English dictated foreign pol
icy to the Scots, and the Dutch and French were traditional
rivals of the English, in both war and com�erce.

In addition,

the Navigation Act of 1651, which required Commonwealth
trade to be transported in Commonwealth ships, dealt a heavy
b low to the Scots, who had lost many of their already scarce
merchantmen in the late Civil War.

Scottish shipping also

16s. R. Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Pro
tectorate (New York: AMS Press-,-Inc., 1965), II, 135. Al
though the central government became the Protectorate in
1653, the structure which bound England, her colonies, Ire
land and Scotland continued to be called the Commonwealth.
Thus, the relationship which existed between England and
Scotland during that period (1652-1660) will hereafter be
referred to as the Commonwealth union.
17 w·11·
.
. h Eng1and:
wit
1 1am Ferguson, Scotland's Relations
A Survey to 1707, p. 153.

7
had to cope with Dutch and Spanish privateers, against whom
the English navy provided no protection.
The last event which had a significant impact on Scot
tish trade during the Commonwealth union was Cromwell's
plantation of Ulster.

Fifty thousand Scottish families colo-

_nized Ulster in the seventeenth century, a great number of
them settling there in the 1650's�

This group provided a

market for Scots' goods in Ireland.18

Although trade with

England and Ireland did not immediately flourish during this
period, the Commonwealth effectively altered Scottish trad
ing patterns.

Ties with traditional Dutch markets were

weakened, while the seeds were planted for future growth in
Anglo-Scottish comrnerce.19
Another disadvantage for the Scots which surfaced as a
consequence of the Commonwealth union was the protection af
forded English manufacturers.

For instance, in the skin and

hide industry, the Scots were prohibited from exporting their
surplus to England in order to protect the English tanning
20
in
. dustry.
Since Scotland had been incorporated into the
Commonwealth merely to make political control easier for
Cromwell, the union proved unpopular on both sides of the
. Wh'ite, Agricu
_ 18 Ian
. 1ture and the Society in Seventeenth
Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd.,
1974), p. 12.
19Theodore Keith, The
Commercial Relations of England
and Scotland, 1603-1707�ambridge, 1910), pp. 61-65.
20rbid.,
p. 70.

8

border.

The public in both nations was against it simply

because of traditional ill feelings between the two.

Puri

tan politicians in England soon found that Scottish taxes
could not support the costs associated with their army of
occupation, while the Scots resented control from London
· and, of course, the military occupation itself.

Commercially,

Scottish traders feared the loss of their established French
and Dutch customers, while the English merchants disapproved
of increased northern competition in their domestic market.
The importance of the events of the 1650's, for this study,
lies in the effect which they had on weakening the Scottish
Dutch connection and in laying the foundations of future
commercial relations between England and Scotland.

The Pur

itan Interregnum also defined the particular roles which those
nations would play right into the eighteenth century,

Eng

land dictating foreign policy and Scotland adjusting her
commercial activities accordingly.
Although the Scots were glad to regain their independ
ence with the restoration of Charles II in 1660, they were
frustrated by Westminster's revised Navigation Act of the
same year, which bill denied Scottish shipping access to the
English colonies in America.

That statute initiated a

period of protectionist policy in both countries.

Trade

barriers were raised against Scottish linen, beef, coal,
skins and yarn. 21 Edinburgh, in retaliation, followed the
21T. c. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of ·the Union,
1660-1707, p. 195.

9

example of Westminster and passed a Scottish Navigation Act
which encouraged the use of Scottish ships in her English,
Irish and continental trades.

This, however, proved inef

fective, since the Scottish economy was not strong enough
to win mercantile wars with a coITLmercial giant like England.
Nevertheless, Scottish leaders had to respond in some way
to English policies because they were under pressure from
the nation's merchants.

Scotland's dilemma was clearly il-

lustrated in the following plaintive letter from the Scot
tish Privy Council to Charles II in 1666:
Most sacred sovereign, There hes bein so many
addresses made to us for representing . . . the
want of trade occasioned by the late acts of your
Parliament of England imposing so great customes
upon our native commodities .
. and by the act
of navigation which is made use of against the
masters of the shipes, as if they were strangers
and not your Majesties subjects. 22
By 1681, the Scottish Council was accepting suggestions
from all quarters for remedies to their commercial quandry.
In that year, the Provost of Linlithgow was called before
the council to propose a solution to the impasse.

He ar

gued that, political union being out of the question due to
lingering memories of Cromwell's occupation, "ane union of
trai"d may be endeavored . . . . " 2 3
- All such notions fell upon deaf ears at Whitehall and
Westminster.
42.

There was no incentive for the English to

22Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, Ser. 3, II,
Hereafter cited as R. P. C. s.

23Ibid., Ser. 3, VII, 65
3.

10
adjust their trading policies because the Scots had little
that the English consumer could not buy elsewhere of better
quality.

Thus, the Scots continued to pressure their neigh-

bor with tariffs to no avail.

As if matters were not bad

enough, Charles embroiled his kingdoms in two costly wars
with the Dutch between 1665 and 1674.

An unfortunate side

effect of those Anglo-Dutch wars was the closing of Dutch
ports to Scottish, as well as English, vessels, creating an
additional obstacle to the already dwindling Dutch-Scottish
trade.
However, the wars brought other worries to merchants
besides the loss of their markets.

Pleas were soon entered

with the Edinburgh Council to allow merchants to ship goods
in "forraign bottomes," meaning non-British vessels of
friendly nations, because Dutch privateers were harassing
Scottish ships.24 Perhaps the most galling aspect of the
situation for the Scots was that Charles expected them to
provide a contingent of men to fight in a war which was
damaging their economy.

In 1665, the same Privy Council

which had listened to the complaints of the nation's mer
chants must have been loathe to publicize the missive from
Charles' English ministers announcing a call to arms.
"Loving friends," it began,
24 R. P. c. §_., Ser. 3, II, 96.

•r

11
The Kings Majesty, being resolved to imploy the
seamen of this kingdom to serve in his royal
navy . . . and, in case ye find not persons will
ing to undergo that service, that ye immediately
seize upon their persons 2nd send the� to Leith
[the port of embarcation] .25
Charles II's attitude alienated many Scots from the
_House of Stuart and the king's authority�

Faced with the

prohibition of trade with their best customers, the Dutch,
and with high tariffs on the rest of the Continent and in
England, the Scots took the only course of action which was
left to them:

they flaunted the law.

Scotsmen developed a flagrant disregard for Acts of
Parliament and Acts of Counci1.26 Few merchants observed
customs regulation and bribery was frequent, if not in fact
27
The Scots' success in smuggling must be attriburampant.
ted to their frugality.

They bought inexpensively-built

craft from the Dutch, outfitted and operated them well below
the cost of English vessels and loaded them with the cargos
of many merchants so that the smallest cranny would not go
28 In this
way, they were able to undersell English
unfilled.
and continental competitors and enhance their meagre export
trade.
251b·1·d., Ser. 3, I, 606- 607 .

26 R. P. C. �-, Ser. 3., � # .xxiv.
27
Keith, The Commercial Relations of England and Scot
land, p. 75.
28rbid., p. 141.

1

12
One might assume that a di££erent approach to northern af
fairs would have marked the accession of William III since
the Scottish Revolution of 1689, which brought him to power,
symbolized popular rejection 0£ despotic rule.
appointment of the Scots, this was not the case.

To the dis
William

and his successor Anne continued to alienate the inhabitants
of their northern kingdom in the tradition of their prede
cessors.

Tariff barriers remained intact, and Scotsmen

were required to sacrifice themselves in still greater num

bers in wars which were not of their making.29

The damage

which these wars inflicted on Scottish commerce was con
siderable and crippling.
The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland contain many
petitions for the redress of losses incurred during the
fighting, a typical example being the appeal of George Lock
hart, a Glasgow merchant who, in June 1703, pleaded with
Parliament for a customs post as restitution for the sink30
ing of twenty-two ships of which he was part owner.
Many
petitioners may have exaggerated their losses, but it cannot
be denied that losses were incurred and that they further
eroded Anglo�Scottish relations ih the new century.

It be-

came obvious at whose expense the wars were being waged,
when English warships began to sink Scottish vessels caught

l

29These were William's
attempts, in the War of the
League of Augsburg (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish
Succession (1702-1713), to curb the ambition of Louis XIV.
JOA. P. �-, XI, 49.

trading with the Continent.31

13
The Scots tried to remedy the

situation unilaterally by negotiating with France in 1701 to
regain the trading privileges which they had lost as a re
sult of their connection with England.

The French refused

to bargain, however, because without William's sanction any
.

agreement arrived at would have been worthless.

32

Had the Scots been successful in their negotiations
with the French, it would have profitted them little, for by
the late seventeenth century, England had replaced Holland
and France as Scotland's most valuable partner in trade.
Most important in this almost revolutionary development was
the rise of the Scottish cattle and linen industries.

Linen

had received a boost in the 1650's, when the Commonwealth
union opened England to Scottish production.

Most northern

goods could not compete with English products because they
lacked high quality; but for just that reason the linen manu
facturers found a market in the south.

The prolific and

teeming lower classes in England, more often than not, could
only afford the cheaper Scottish cloth.

The cattle trade,

on the other hand, did not make strong inroads in·the south
until the 1690's, when it began to challenge linen as the
33
chief export to England.
Consequently, by 1700, the Scots
31rbid., XI, 247.
32
Keith, The Commercial Relations of England and Scotland,
pp. 149-150.
33Bruce Lenrnan, An E
conomic History of Modern Scotland
(Hamden r Ct.: Shoe String Press, 1977), p. 23.

r

14
were commercially bound as never before to their southern
neighbor, but increasingly displeased with existing commer
cial and political relations as they functioned under the
union of crowns.
The dissatisfaction was enhanced, at the turn of the
·century, by an incident known as the ''Darien Scheme," per
haps the worst economic disaster in Scottish history .

This

was a plan devised by a group of Scottish investors to es
tablish a purely Scottish colony on the Isthmus of Darien
in present-day Panama.34 The promoters reasoned that the
colony would serve as an entrepot for oriental goods, re
ducing by half the expense and time of navigation to Japan
and China and, at the same time, serve as a market for
Scotland's manufacturers.

The plan was sound in theory,

but to have succeeded would have required expert organiza
tion and the support of the royal government.
provided.

Neither was

William discouraged support of the scheme by ack

nowledging the Spanish claim to the region, while the poor
planning of the organizers ensured the demise of the project.
Almost �150,000 was lost on the venture, a tremendous amount
of capital in those days.

Additionally, 2,000 Scottish men,

women and children paid with their lives, due largely to
fever and ill-preparedness, between the initial landing in
November, 1698, and the abandonment of the colony on April 12,
34For a complete account, see G. P. Insh, The Company of
Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, London, 1932.

r

1700.

35

15
To make matters worse, over 1200 influential Scots

had subscribed to the undertaking, making it a calamity of
national proportions.

In retrospect, it is obvious that

the "organization of the expedition was greatly inferior to
its conception.1136 Yet, the ill planning of the scheme was
overlooked by most Scots and the entire blame was laid on
the English.

It was, perhaps, the most visible sign that

the union of crowns could not continue to operate as it had
for the previous one-hundred years.

35Pryde, Scotland fr�
1603 to the Present Dav, p. 48.
.
36Rob.ert S. Rait,
H'istory of Scot 1 and (London: Thorn�
ton Butterworth Ltd., 1914), p.211.
I
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CHAPTER II
Parliament and Power in Scotland
Since the Edinburgh Parliament played the leading role
in Scotland in bringing about the political union of 1707,
it is necessary to gain some idea of how that body was
structured and whom it represented; for though it was similar
in name, the Scotti3h Parliament had few parallels with its
English counterpart in terms of function and method.

Where

as in England there were two Houses of Lords and Commons,

Scottish representatives hailed from three "Estates" and met

as a unicameral body in Parliament House in Edinburgh.

Nobles, lairds and burgesses comprised the three Estates,37
although there had been a fourth, the clergy.

The latter

had been suspended briefly during the rebellion aga inst

Charles I and the subsequent Civil War, and though restored

by Charles II in 1661, they were permanentl y removed from

the Edinburgh legislature following the Revolution of 1689.
Thus

it was that the Church of Scotland, otherwise so promi

nent in the post-Reformation affairs of the nation, had little

chance to influence the union issue.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the English and
the Scottish legislatures lay in the amount of authority that
37
The official title of a lairdly M. P. was that of
"commissioner of the shire" although in the A. P. s. , the
ter ms "laird" and "baron" are frequently used as synonyms.

I

I

17
each possessed in its own country.

Unlike Westminster, in

which from earliest times, peers and commoners had united
to inhibit the power of the crown, the men who sat in Parlia
ment House in Edinburgh were often preoccupied in personal
rivalries with other members of the institution.

Such power

'in politics as a Scotsman might possess was directly rela
ted to the amount of land over which he had jurisdiction.
For example, John Campbell, the Duke of Argyll, played a
conspicuous and influential role in the union controversy,
though he was barely in his twenties when the issue engrossed
the attention of the nation.

The explanation of his import

ance at such a relatively young age lies in the patrimony
which he inherited from his father.

In 1705, young Camp-

bell's dominions included the dukedom of Argyll, the mar
quisates of Kintyre and Lorn, the earldoms of Campbell and
Cowal, the viscounties of Lochow and Glenyla, the lordships
of Inverary, Mull, Morvern and Tirie, plus the heritable
justiceship general of the shire of the Argyll Isles and
the heritable sheriffdom and lord high lieutenancy of the

38
same county.

The influence which a noble exerted over the inhabitants
of such dominions derived from royal charters granted as
rewards for service to the crown.

The charters, which were

separately issued for each new title, listed the privileges
38 A. P. S., XI, 205.
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which the recipient would enjoy in his new domain.

It was

through these appurtenances that he drew support from the
shires.

Again using Argyll as an example, Queen Anne certi

fied his rights in 1705 to the "teinds, offices, fees,
duties, few duties, castles, touers, . . . mills, .
. woods, forrests, isles, lochs, fishings, coals, .

. dona-

tions and rights of patronage and other pertinents [within
Argyllshire] .

It is understandable, after view ing

a charter, how county commissioners who lived within a noble
man's jurisdiction and would sit with him in Parliament might
feel compelled to rally behind his causes in the legisla40
ture.
The shires contained ninety percent of the Scottish
population, the remaining ten percent being the inhabitants
.11
Those who dwelt in the shires, exof the royal burghs. �epting peers, ranged in status from peasants to well
endowed lairds.

The latter were sometimes granted the lowest

grade of nobility, namely a barony, for service to the crown,
although they were still considered a part of the Estate of
the lairds.

All stations of life in the counties were inter

dependent in what was still an almost feudal system.

However,

commerce had replaced the feudal need for security as the tie
39A. P. �-, XI, 249 & 250.

40 These privileges will be of additional importa
nce in
the next chapter as examples of the commercial interests of
wealthy Scottish landowners.
41
Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland, p. 17.
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which bound the members together.

Within this system there

existed a network of burghs of barony, which served as seats
of local government on the estates of the lairds who had been
knighted as barons.

There were about 210 such baronies by

the late seventeenth century, few of them more than villages.
Special

fairs and markets were allowed in them several times

a year, at which by law the purely domestic produce of the
countryside was traded and sometimes sent to a royal burgh
from whence it could be shipped overseas.42
In addition to their markets, burghs of barony could
usually boast a Baron Court at which the laird.or his deputy,
the baillie, could settle disputes involving unpaid rent,
trespassing, or other local grievances.43 With a court of
his own, it might seem likely that the laird would have abused
his power; this was rarely the case, for he generally relied
upon his tenants' payments-in-kind of livestock, dairy pro
ducts or grain to sustain his larder or to sell for cash
which could be used to buy manufactured goods at the royal
burghs.

The laird, then, looked after his tenants' welfare

and supported legislation in their interest, if he qualified
to vote for members of Parliament or was fortunate enough to
44 To be elected or to enjoy the franchise,
be elected himself.
& 36.

42

Lenman, An Economic History of .Modern Scotland, pp. 35

43
Smout, History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830, pp.
123-126.
44
Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: The Shaping of a Nation
(London: David & Charles, 1980), pp-:-2-34-237.
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a laird had to own land granted by the crown and assessed
at forty shillings annual value.45 Each shire sent two
representatives to Edinburgh, except Kinross and Clackmannan
which, because of their small size, were each allowed only
46
one.
However, once in Parliament, the commissioners of
-the shires did not generally act in concert in opposition
to either of the other two Estates.

Instead, as has been

intimated, they tended to support the noble who had juris
diction over the area in which they lived.
Although they had for the most part an independent na
ture, royal burghs also sometimes fell under the sway of the
nobility.

Such was the case at the close of the century,

when Inverary and Kintore fell under the power of the Earl
47
of Kintore.
Since each royal burgh was granted a charter
directly from the crown and was therefore in theory only
accountable to the monarch, nobles had no legal jurisdiction
over a royal burgh.

Consequently, once a peer had gained

control of a burgh, he had to establish a system of patronage
·.
8
For the most
. hes were carried out4
. at h.is wis
to ensure th
part, however, the royal burghs presented themselves as a
· .
45 R. S. Rait,
The Parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow:
Maclehose, Jackson &Co., 1924), pp-.-210-215. This condition
for voting existed between 1587 and 1832.
46 �. �- �., IX, 152.
47Edward Dunbar-Dunbar, Social Life in Former Days
(Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1846T'; o. 164.
48
Ibid., p. 164.
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more unified group than either of the other two Estates.
This was true largely because they had a forum, the Conven
tion of Royal Burghs, in whi ch they met outside of Parlia
ment to discuss their common interests.
The earliest monopolies of the royal burghs were be
'stowed by William the Lion, king of Scotland in the twelfth
century.

Nonetheless, it was not until 1552 that the first

regular meetings of the Convention took place.

49

From that

time onward, it acted as an advisory body to the Estates of
Parliament, the Privy Council and the monarch on matters of
commerce.

Furthermore, it organized foreign trade on behalf

of the royal burghs by establishing links with key ports on
the Continent to facilitate the marketing of Scottish goods
abroa d. SC By the late seventeenth century, there were seventy members of the Convention, one from each such royal burgh.
The royal burgh system was based of the economic re
wards and responsibilities which were common to almost all
royal burgh charters.

All such towns were granted from the

first, a monopoly to deal in foreign trade within a specified
landward area in Scotland.

For substantial towns such as

Edinburgh, Dumbarton and Glasgow, ·a deepwater port capable
of servicing vessels engaged in overseas commerce was also

41 Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland, pp.

455 & 458.

50 Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707,
p. 185.
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guaranteed.

51-

In addition to a monopoly o= foreign trade,

the burghs were granted the exclusive right of marketing
imported merchandise at their markets and =airs. In return,
they supplied men for the royal army and navy; they main
tained prisons; and rnost important, they �ere a main source
. of revenue for the government and the royal household.

The

crown's receipts from the royal burghs consisted of a quota
of the national tax burden and of income derived from import
5
duties.
.
2 Even though the royal burghs contained an inappreciable amount of the country's population, they were a dy
namic element in terms of national economic growth.

Their

Convention represented the interests which would eventually
bring success to Scottish commerce in the eighteenth and
.
. teenth centuries. 53
nine
The men who were sent to represent their burghs in the
Convention and in Parliament were elected to their positions

by their town councils.54

The councils were filled predomi

nantly with merchant burgesses, rather than craftsmen who
were considered socially inferior and too commerically con
servative by the merchants, although the craftsmen were also
51
Lenman, An Economic History o= Modern Scotland, p. 34.
52
Theodora Keith, "The Trading Relations of the Royal
Burghs of Scotland," �- !:!· B_., 28 (1913), 455-460.
53
Theodora Keith, "Influence of the Convention of Royal
Burghs of Scotland on the Economic Develop�ent of Scotland
Before 1707," �- H. !s_., 10 (1912), 251-256.

54necisions of the
Lords of Council and Session, Lord
Fountainhall, ed.-,-(Ednibur:gh, 1683-1687) -;--Yr, 74. Hereafter
cited as D. L. C. s.
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burgesses.

The main distinction between the two was that

the craftsman plied his wares within the immediate prox
imity of the burgh, while the merchant often went beyond
the town limits, sometimes overseas, to trade.

The dif

ference in status and influence between the two was clearly
demonstrated in 1661 when Parliament followed the advice of
the Convention and forced a group of craftsmen who were on
the Montrose town council to vacate their positions in favor
of merchant burgesses.55 Although the advice of the Conven
tion was aimed at serving the interests of its members and
of itself, the maintenance of merchant-dominated town coun
cils insured the pre-eminence of trading interests, thus
stimulating the economy.

Craftsmen, on the other hand,

tended to be conservative and concerned only with satisfy
ing the local customers whom they already served.56 In the
Estate of the royal burghs, therefore, credit for support
of pro-trade legislation must go to the merchant class, and
when hereafter mention is made of burgh representatives in
Edinburgh, it is most often merchants who are spoken of.
The Estates of Parliament uncharacteristically played
a central role in formulating the· policy which guided Scot
land between the Revolution of 1689 and the dissolution of
their own institution in 1707.

This may seem commonplace

to the modern reader, but to the Scots of the day it was a
55
�- �- �-, VII, 39.
56
smout, History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830, p. 172.
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major innovation on the political scene.

Prior to the reign

of William and Mary, major Scottish policies, both foreign
and domestic, had been devised either by t�e king or by the
institutions which he controlled.
The two instruments which were most frequently employed
by Scotland's monarchs to advance their policies prior to
1689 were the Privy Council and the Committee of the Lords
of the Articles.

These two bodies were often used in con

junction by the sovereign, a circumstance which resulted
from the fact that membership in the two bodies was frequent
ly shared.

Privy Councilors were nominated by the crown,

and the monarchy, too, played the leading role in arranging
57
the election of the Lords of the �_rticles.
This form of
royal management extended to the legislative process.

Be

fore 1689, except in the rarest of instances, policy was
set by the Privy Council and then presented through the
Lords of the Articles as an agenda in Parliament.

This was

the normal and accepted manner of introducing legislation.
Under the early Stuarts, few measures reached the floor of
the House except those approved by the Lords of the Articles.
Members of the Estates might, and often did, make sugges
tions, but if they were ignored there was little action they
could take.

Approving prescribed legislation was often the

only business that Parliament was summoned to do, as was the
case in June 1633, when the legislature passed 168 statutes
57Ral·t , The Parliaments of Scotland, pp. 8-10.
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, 58
in a single daJ.
The measure of popular displeasure with such a system
became apparent when Parliament took control of the nation
between 1638 and 1651 in reaction to Charles I's attempts
to reinstate episcopacy in Scotland.

As soon as the legis-

, lators had control of the government, they abolished the
Committee of the Lords of the Articles and rescinded the
privilege of the clergy, traditional supporters of the crown,
to sit as an Estate in the House.

Unwisely, Charles II

reconstituted the Committee of the Articles and readmitted
the clerics to Parliament in 1660.59 These actions are
understandable in light of Charles' desire to preserve his
influence in Scotland and to secure the continuance of the
House of Stuart.

It was with that desire in mind that

Charles, throughout his reign, concentrated

power in the

hands of those whom he could trust, namely his appointed
Privy Councilors.

Such despotism was finally removed from

Scottish politics by the Revolution of 1689, which threw
over James II and brought in his son-in-law William III.
The Scottish legislators, the principal beneficiaries of
the Revolution, acted as their forefathers had when they
had gained sovereignty in 1638.

In Parlia.�ent, the cleri-

cal Estate and the Committee of the Articles were permanent
ly abolished.
58
59

Thus, the Scottish legislature was afforded

Donaldson, Scotland:

The Shaping of� Nation, p. 97.

Pryde, Scotland From 1603 to the Present Day, p. 8.

26

the opportunity to exercise more power until the decision
of its members to support the union and vote their institu
tion out of existence.

In fact, the best �easure of the dy

namic growth in influence of the Edinburgh Parliament was
the willingness, in 1705, of Queen Anne's �nglish ministers
to open their jealously guarded colonial and domestic mar
kets to the Scots in exchange for assurance, by the disso
lution of the Scottish Parliament in 1707, that the north
ern kingdom would cause no further political problems for
Westminster.
What, however, the average Scot gained by the aboli
tion of government by royal management could be deemed a
diminuation in the influence of the nation's aristocracy;
for it had been they, the peers of the realm, who had bene
fitted most from the old system.

As a result, the nobility

began to channel their energies in more profitable direc
tions, such as commerce, and harnessed the growing power of
Parliament House to do so.

CHAPTER III
The Landed Interest in Trade
During the seventeenth century, Scottish trade experi, enced a trend toward decentralization, and by 1700, the
royal burghs were sharing their prior monopoly of foreign
trade with burghs of barony and individual landowners.

The

affect was visible in Parliament, where a great deal more
personally motivated legislation of an economic nature was
supported and passed by the nobility and the shires, the
main beneficiaries of decentralization.

The most important

consequence, however, was that by 1705 commerce would become
the focus of concern when Parliament had to decide whether
or not to pursue a closer union with England.
The process of decentralization took root in Scotland
because the system of royal burgh privileges, around which
commerce was organized, was outdated and inhibited the growth
of the country's external trade.

The royal burghs had held

exclusive foreign trading rights since the thirteenth cen
tury, and they had guarded those freedoms jealously.
burghal system was failing for a number of reasons.

The
The

Convention of Royal Burghs was a conservative body and it
placed an emphasis on maintaining old privileges and markets,
rather than encou�aging new foreign enterprises.

In addi

tion, the royal burghs could not make full use of their

28
monopoly because many lacked sufficient capital.

Inevitably,

burghs of barony and noble landowners began to encroach upon
the markets of the royal burghs by trading directly with
foreign ports without sharing the accompanying responsibili
ties of taxation, so that it became increasingly obvious
·that some change would have to be made in the system which
had served Scotland for the previous three centuries.60 It
had been an adequate system as long as Scots communities had
little to offer foreigners for their more exotic goods.

How

ever, a program which excluded, as this one did, developing
communities with more to offer foreign traders could not be
held to have the nation's material interests at heart.
Parliament affirmed for the final time in 1633, the
traditional privileges of the royal burghs.

Nevertheless,

even at that early date the commercial interests of the
landowners were becoming ever more visible.

By 1637, John

Shaw, laird of Greenock, had obtained from Parliament the
right to hold additional fairs and markets in his burgh of
barony beyond the number granted in his charter.

He needed

extra fairs because he had managed to entice commercial
traffic to his barony, traffic which had originally been
bound for the royal burah of Glasgow further up_the River
Clyde.61

60J.· D. Marwick, The
River Clvde & the Clyde Bur9hs
(Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, 1909), p.-149.
61rbid., pp. 80-81.
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64

The various acts which divested the royal burghs of
their coror.�ercial monopoly in the seventeenth century provi
ded room into which the burghs of barony could gradually
expand.

One hundred and ten baronies were created between

1660 and 1707.

They multiplied because landowners channelled

their predominantly agricultural surpluses through markets
6
which they could controi. 5 They did this because of the
privileges which attended a market.

The government of a

barony was the recipient of ''all and sundry liberties priv
iledges immunities tolls customes emoluments casualties
profits and duties'' of these weekly·affairs.66 And since
the local noble, more often than not, appointed the burgh's
important officers, he was assured that the proceeds of the
67
market would be disposed of as he saw fit.
From time to
time, Parliament was more direct in its awards, especially
if the recipient was actually sitting in the House.

Such

was the case when, in 1705, the Duke of Gordon, the Marquess
of Tweeddale, and the Earls of Erroll and Wigton were grant
ed the benefits of their local fairs because from the floor
64A. �- �-, IX, 315; X, 176-77.
65 ·11·ie Thornpson, "Rf
.
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e ormation
" 'in Scott'ish
Wi
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Capitalism: Class, St2te and Nation, from before the Union
to the Present, Tony Dickson, ed. (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1980), p. 79.
66�- �- �-, XI, 202.

67Ibid., XI, 200.
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they had requested the same.68
These awards were not limited to burghs of barony.
Many nobles were awarded fairs in order to service simul
taneously a number of isolated, non-burghal communities.
For example, Stenton in East Lothian, Bowden in Roxburgh,
•Leslie in Fife and Old Deer in Aberdeen were all granted
fairs in 1661, though none were burghs of barony.

Such

awards increased dramatically in the late seventeenth cen
Only one such fair was granted between 1517 and 1570,
69
ten between 1571 and 1660, but 246 between 1661 and 1707.
tury.

Another sign that the concentration of commercial power
had begun to diffuse from the royal burghs by the turn of
century was that a .considerable number of tenants had begun
to pay their landlords in hard currency, instead of in fowl,
70
However, the
grain or livestock as had been customary.
involvement of landowners in commerce was not completely
novel, and burghs of barony and isolated fairs were not
their only means of participating in the economy.
Lairds and nobles had always been allowed to export
surpluses in exchange for foreign commodities which were
68rbid., XI, 272-77.
69
Smout, History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830. p. 117.
70
T. M. Devine, "The Social Composition of the Business
Class in the Larger Scottish Towns, 1680-1740," in Ireland
and Scotland, 1600-1740, T. M. Devine and D. Dickson, ed's.
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983), p. 165.
That most hard currency in Scotland at that time was foreign,
reflects the poor state of the nation's capital, much of
which was lost in the Darien venture.
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considered necessary for the provisioning of their personal
households on the understanding that the imports would not
be resold. 71 However, a few nobles went beyond providing
for their households.

The Earls of Winton and Wemyss both

used their own ships in trade with Holland and Norway; the
-Earl of Kincardine often traded with London; while the Earls
of Glamis and Seafield both grew enough grain to support a
72
modest intercourse with France, Holland and Norway.
Mining was another endeavor which was particularly
suited to the trading impulses of the peers.

Most mining

operations were located away from the royal burghs, which
were usually located on the coast.

Landed families such as

Elcho, Elphinstone, Dundas, Bruce, Hamilton, Wemyss and Cun
nighhame were, therefore, the main investors in collieries
across the country, though mining was not limited to coal. 73
The Earl of Hopeton owned lead mines at Leadhills in Lanarkshire at the turn of the century. 74 Nor were the nobility
limited to heavy industry and agriculture.

The Earl of

Crornarty, in the north of Scotland, was part owner of a glass
factory at Leith, while the Earl of Eglinton, residing in
71charles Rogers, Social Life in Scotland (1884; rpt.
London: Kennikat, 1971), II, 291.
72
Srnout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707,
4
.
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p
73
Lythe and Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, pp.
40-43.
74
A. P. �-, XI, 466.

75
Ayrsh.ire, was the owner of a sugar factory in
. G 1 asgow.
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An additional way in which the aristocracy was affected
by commerce was in the awarding of various customs sinecures
in return for, or to encourage, service to the crown.

The

Earl of Crawford was granted such a post in the burghs of
'Methil and St. Andrews.76 On a grander scale, the Earl of
Newburgh was appointed the customs inspector for the Anglo
Scottish border from 1660 to 1680.

This was an extremely

lucrative position because, as inspector, Newburgh received
a fifty-percent share of all contraband which he seized,
plus whatever bribes he might have cared to accept for look77
.
1ng
the other way.
Many members of the Estates, in the decade before the
Union, maintained permanent residences in Edinburgh to be
close to Parliament and as a result of living in the capi
tal invested in trade.

Contact between town and country

provided the poorer landed gentry with similar opportunities,
though their commercial contacts were often established
through marriage.

Large dowries convinced many landowners

to share their distinguished names with members of burghal
society.

Although he was by no means poor, the Earl of

Wemyss advanced his estate considerably by wedding the
75 D. L. C. �-, II, 326.
76smout, Scottish T rade
on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707,
p. 38.
77
A. P. S. , VI I, 4 4 3.
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daughter of Colonel Charteris, an Edinburgh merchant; she

came with a dowry of jS0,000 sterling.78
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Far more common '

however, were the marriages between the sons of landed
families and the daughters of burgesses.

Due to the prac

tice of primogeniture in Scotland, which practice excluded
all but the eldest male from the family inheritance, many
younger sons in landed families were forced to seek careers

as merchants or in the professions.

The surest way to be

accepted into the burghal inner circle which ran the town

was to marry the daughter of an established merchant. 79
on the other hand, a laird's son had no connections, he

If,

could still go through the regular seven-year merchant ap

prenticeship.

Those who desired experience in international

commerce usually received training under an established
Scottish trader at a foreign port.

However, this could cost

up to �200 sterling, thus limiting the beneficiaries of
such training to the sons of wealthy burgesses and landown 
ers. BO
The connection between town and country did not involve
a large percentage of the population, but it was important
because it created a group which had similar economic inter
ests and which cut across lines of social distinction.

This

78
Rogers, Social Life in Scotland, I, 112.
79
nevine, "The Social Composition of the Business Class
in the Larger Scottish Towns, 1680-1740," p. 170.
BOibid., p. 172.
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was especially true around the larger burghs.

In his study

of the Glasgow merchant community, T. C. Smout points out
that the social groups of lairds and merchants around Glas
gow "were barely distinguishable" by 1600.81 Thus, during
the seventeenth century, Scottish trade developed into an
-activity in which a much broader cross section of society
than ever before took an interest.

This had a visible af

fect on the attitude of the Estates toward the monarchy.
After the Revolution of 1689, the Edinburgh Parliament
began to challenge the crown on matters involving commerce.
In the Darien affair, the Scottish Estates disregarded King
William's foreign policy interests and encouraged burgh
officials to invest town money in the scheme.

82

And when

the enterprise foundered in the first years of the new
centl;lrY, the Estates declared that "his Majesties preroga
tive in the ordering and disposal of Trade with forreigners,
is one of the grievances represented by the Estates of the
83
Kingdom as prejudicial to the trade of this Nation. 11

The

Scots obviously desired a change in the status quo.
Although Parliament had often urged measures -designed to
aid fledgling manufacturing enterprises, it had never before
been so united behind commerce in the face of royal opposition.
81T. c. Srnout, "The Glasgow Merchant Community in the
Seventeenth Century,"§_. H. �-, XLVII (1968), 70.
82
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It would be the ability of the Scots to overcome their tra
ditional internal social differences and to present a solid
front on this issue which finally convinced the English that
they also could no longer afford to maintain the union of
crowns as it existed.

r
CHAPTER IV
Prelude to Union, 1702-1707
The political events of the first seven years of the
eighteenth century in Scotland laid the necessary ground
work for union.

During that period the Scottish Parliament

worked itself into such a position that the only way to
avoid economic disaster was to end the personal union of the
crowns and negotiate a more binding political amalgamation
with the English.

The means by which that amalgamation was

eventually accomplished was through ·a realignment of Scottish
political factions.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, three such
factions dominated the life of the Scottish legislature,
namely the "Cavaliers" or "Jacobites," the "Court Party,"
and the "Country Party."

None were political parties in

the modern sense of groups which espouse platforms of par

ticular ideas or principles of government.

Rather, the mem

bers were loosely aligned according to religious preference
and their relation to the crown. ·The Jacobites, for example,
were supporters of the claim of the exiled Stuarts.

Most

were Episcopalians or Roman Catholics, and were opposed to
the Revolution settlement altogether.

The Court Party, on

the other hand, as its name implies, was the creature of the
crown and its ministers, devoted to the principles of the
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Revolution and predominantly Episcopalian and Presbyterian
in its makeup.
The last of the three factions, the Country Party,
represented, at least in theory if not always in fact, the
cause of Protestant Scottish nationalism.

Its members

-dreaded the possibility of a Catholic Restoration, but were
resentful of the less than equal treatment afforded their
nation by the Settlement in 1689.

Yet, from time to time,

because of their shared antipathy to England, Jacobites and
"Countrymen," as the members of the Country Party called
themselves, did unite to defeat Court Party measures, as
was the case in the disposition of the Scottish crown.
In 1689, Edinburgh approved Anne Stuart and her off
spring as the successors to the Scottish throne upon the
demise of unprolific William and Mary.

However, Anne had

only one child who survived infancy, the Duke of Gloucester,
and he died in 1700.

Westminster was quick to decide by an

Act of Settlement that, on Anne's death, the Stuart claim
would then devolve on her German Protestant kin, the House
8 .1
of Hanover. - The Country Party and the Jacobites recognized the bargaining power of the succession question and
siezed the opportunity to wring concessions from the crown.
Two acts--one Anent Peace and War, the other an Act of Se
curity--were passed in 1703 and 1704 respectively.

The first

.
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decreed that no war involving Scotland should be
proclaimed
without prior consultation with the Scottish Parlia
ment I
while, more ominously, the second provided that, in
the
event of the queen's death without issue, Scotland woul
d

proclaim as her successor a Protestant, but not the choice

of the English Parliament, unless the welfare of the Scot

tish nation, its legislature, and the Presbyterian religion

were assured:

• . . nor [ran the Act of Security] shall the
same person-in any event be capable to be King
or Queen of both Realms unless a free Communica
tion of trade, the freedom of navigation and the
liberty of the plantations [i.e., access to the
American colonies] be fully agreed to and estab
lished by the Parliament and the Kingdom of
England. B S
Countrymen,

Jacobites, and other disaffected members of

the Estates, to strengthen their hand, also made provision
for the training and arming of a militia to defend the
rights which they had demanded, at the same time withholding
supplies for the financing of the War of the Spanish Succes
sion until the queen agreed to submit.
William had feared such eventualities when, from his
death-bed, on February 28, 1702, he had urged Westminster
to consider a complete union with Scotland.

His own experi

ence h ad convinced him that this was the only viable means
of controlling the north.

Negotiations were actually begun

in the first months of Anne's reign, but were broken off

asA. P. s.' xr,

70.
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when the English refused compensation for the Darien inves
tors and equal access to colonial markets, two points on
·
which the Scots would not budge.86 Complicating matters
had been Anne's abrasive announcement in the midst of the
arbitrations that war had been formally declared against
France and Spain and that the Scots, even though they had
not been consulted, "for the honour and safety of the king
dom," would be expected to contribute materially in troops
87
This was another case of the northern king
and supplies.
dom being forced into a war which it could ill afford and
88
in which it had little intere�t.
The new Parliament which was returned to Edinburgh in
May, 1703, was the last to represent a sovereign and inde
pendent Scotland, and since it ultimately ratified the treaty
which joined England and Scotland, it has been known there
after as the "Union Parliament."

During that year, however,

few members were thinking of union.

Instead, the majority

of them were intent upon righting the wrongs that they were
convinced had been heaped upon Scotland by the overbearing
English.

Never before had the Scottish Estates played such

a key role in· that country's decision-making process, or in
86 Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England:
vey to 1707, p. 202.
87A. P. �-, XI, 12.

A Sur-

88Th�
Jacobites, in fact, had definite French sympathies,
since Louis XIV was the acknowledged friend of the exiled "Old
Pretender," James Edward Stuart.
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directing the general affairs of the kingdom.
In England, meanwhile, there was concern over the Act
of Security, and the ban on the Scottish supply was severely
felt on account of French successes during 1703.

Military

action against the Scots was actually considered in London
, until the Edinburgh Parliament decided to let the Act of
Security go before the queen without the clause on free
trade, though they resolved not to name a successor until
satisfactory commercial concessions had been made.

Thus,

repeatedly, the Scots tried to impress their southern neigh
bors with the need to ensure that Scottish trade would not
be jeopardized by their connection to England.

Much to their

dismay, their efforts ellicited exactly the opposite reac
tion from what they had expected.
It must be kept in mind that, throughout these first
two years of the Union Parliament, the primary goal of the
crown and of Westminster had been to secure the Hanoverian
succession in Scotland.

Anne made this quite clear in a

letter which was read to the Estates in July of 1704:
The main thing that We recommend to yow . . . is
the settleing of the Succession in the Protestant
Line, as that which is absolutely necessary for
your own peace and happiness, as well as our quiet
and security in all our Dominions.89
As the first attempt at union had failed, Anne decided to
try a different approach to guarantee the Hanoverian succes89A. P. �- XI, 126.
,
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sion.

Her chief Scottish minister, the Earl of Seafield,

brought about a realignment of traditional party interests
in 1704 over the issue of the succession.

By promising at

tractive employments, such as Secretary of State and Treas
urer-Depute, to John Hay, Marquess of Tweeddale and his fol, lowers in the Country Party, Seafield briefly tipped the
balance of power in the court's favor.
of aligning the remaining Countrymen

This had the effect
in an alliance with

the Jacobites in a new Opposition, but Seafield was unconcerned because he assumed he controlled a majority in the House.
However, this tack was temporarily unsuccessful.

The Duke of

Queensberry, a lonstanding member of the Court Party, was sliqhted
by the elevation of Hay's supporters and, for a while, he and
pis followers refused to· cooperate in the succession.
While the Court Party was consolidating its majority
in 1704 and 1705, Westminster enacted legislation which
forced Edinburgh to act on the issue of the Scottish succes
sion.

The Alien Act, as it came to be called, was passed by
90 It decreed that unless, by
Westminster on March 14, 1705 .
the end of the year, the Hanoverian line was accepted in
Scotland, Scotsmen would be treated as aliens in England
and the import of Scottish coal, cattle and linen into Eng
land and Ireland would be prohibited, although in the pre
amble to the act, Westminster indicated that a union of the
90naiches, Scotland and the Union, p. 107.
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nations would also be acceptable.
The Alien Act focused on economic issues which affected
the nobility in particular.

The clause which threatened the

Scots with alien status in England was aimed directly at
them.

Some, like the Duke of Hamilton, had estates in Eng

·1and, and many peers made trips to St. James in the hope of
ingratiating themselves with the queen.

The disruption of

the coal trade also threatened problems for many of the aris
tocracy.

Not only were several peers in the House involved

in the extraction of the fuel; there were others whose coal
dependent industries would have been affected by any fluctu.
.
. 91 Still other peers,
ations in the price and the supp1 Y o f it.
the Earl of Galloway for one, had a vested interest in sel
ling cattle to the English, and while the manufacture of
linen was not financed to any extent by the nobility, the
prohibition of its sale in the south would have been a dis
aster, as it remained with beef, one of the two primary
Scottish exports. 92

Had the Scots decided to live with the

Alien Act, an economic calamity of the proportions of the
Darien scberne, or worse, would have resulted.
Late in August, 1705, several members of the House ex
pressed the hope that Parliament would come to some conclu91The Earls of Cromarty and Eglinton were two House
members who had, respective�y, in glas� m�king and sugar
refining good reason to desire a_flo�rishing coal trade.
.
Consequently, their votes for un1on in 1707 reflected their
economic interests.
92
tland, p. 310.
Mitchison, A History of Sco
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sion on the subject of negotiations for.union, or on particular measures which might afford protection to the articles

of trade specified in the English bill.93

The members were

obviously worried about the impending southern embargo
against coal, linen, and beef.

Yet, less than a fortnight

'later, two retaliatory responses to the Alien Act were suggested.

One would have forbidden Scottish peers to enter

England, and the other proposed a suspension of English
trade with Scotland until the Alien Act had been repealed.
These attempts at bravado in the face of English sanctions
were unanimously "Carried in the negative," or voted down,
after a single reading.

It was definitely no time for pos-

turing if it meant jeopardizing the interests of the members

of the House. 94

There were, in fact only three options open to the
Estates.

They could open negotiations for a fully incorpora

ting un{on, which offered at least the possibility of free
t rade; they could approve the Hanoverian succession and main
tain the status quo under the existing union of crowns; or
they could call England's bluff, dissolve their connection
with their neighbor and risk the probability of an English
military occupation.

From a practical point of-view, however,

dissolving the union of crowns and facing up to English
93A. P. s. I XI, 224.
94
Ibid., XI, 238-39.
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economic and military might was out of the question, as
likewise was Scotland's continued subordinate position
under the oersonal union of crowns.

It was obvious, there-

fore, that the only practical choice open to the legisla
tors was to treat for union.
On September 1, 1705, the Estates passed a bill author 
izing negotiations for a union, the commissioners represent
ing Scotland to be appointed by the Queen.

It was a con

cession of considerable significance, for it marked the
crumbling of Scottish resistance in the face of the panic
caused by the Alien Act.

More than that, it was a signal

from Edinburgh that Scotland was prepared to submit and an
admission that the northern kingdom's economic survival de
pended on England.

A further realization of the parties

involved was the knowledge that at the bargaining table it
would be the southerners who would dictate the terms of the
future �olitical relationship between the two countries.
Initially, since public opinion and patriotic oratory
in Scotland were enflamed against the actions of the Estates,
the outlook for the success of the negotiations was bleak.
Sir John Clerk, a member of the Scottish delegation and
fervent supporter of union, recalled in later years his
feelings of foreboding before he left for London, where the

talks had been scheduled to begin in April, 1706:

I had observed a great backwardness in the Parlia
ment of Scotland for an union with England of any
ed not but . . .
kind whatsoever, and therefore �oubt
h
the
wit
uneasy
urn
ret
to
I should be obliged

reflexion of having either done nothing, or
nothing to the purpose, as had been the case 9
of former Commissioners appointed to this end. 5
Clerk, however, had miscalculated.
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To his delight and that

of the majority of the Scottish delegation, he was to return
to Edinburgh in the suwJTier of 1706 with an agreement in hand
·Which would soon be approved by the Scottish Parliament.

95
Life of Sir John Cl�rk
Sir John Clerk, Memoirs �f the
T. and
le,
· A. Constao
Of Pen i, cu i'k , Jo hn Gray , ed.. (Edinburgh: M
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··
•" alluded to are those who had failed in the
C omrnissioners
earlier negotiations in 1703.

r

C.f-U1.PTER V
Ratification
When the negotiators returned to Scotland with the
treaty, public opinion was still set against it.
of the Opposition Party, disaffected Countrymen

Members
and Jaco

bites, had been hard at work enflaming the traditionally
hostile Scottish attitude toward the English.
opposed union for many reasons.

Scotsmen

The Jacobites were cer

tainly no favorers of the agreement, for by securing the
Hanoverian succession, it would dash the hopes of the exiled
Stuarts.

Catholics were against it because the Hanoverian

succession would be a Protestant succession, and there were

others who, like Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, desired a

Scottish republic completely independent of English influ
ence.

However, there was little hope of postponing union

because of the underlying threat of additional economic
sanctions being imposed from the south.

In their campaign, futile though it was, the Opposition

had enlisted the aid of the press.

As Daniel Defoe, th�

Westminster-appointed chronicler of the union debates,
Pointed out:

No sooner therefore was the Parliament met, and
the eyes of all the nation fixed upon the event
_
of this great affair, but . . . innumerab
le pam 
_
phlets were printed and dispersed over the whole

✓

kingdom; and industriously harangued upon . .

96
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There were few broadsheets at this time, but pamphleteers
had a field day hawking such titles as the "Lawful Preju
dices against an Incorporating Union with England" and the
more colorful "Smoking Flare unquenchable, where a Union
.betwixt the Two Kingdoms is dissicated, anatomised, confuted,
and annuled." 9 7 Such propaganda inspired those who held
the franchise to make their opinions known to their repre
sentatives.

Dozens of petitions from burghs and shires

were received in Parliament during the months of debate in
9
the winter of 1706-07. 7 Voters, like those in Dumbarton,
were convinced that the union was "of the most dangerous
consequence to all the interests civil and sacred of the
nation, and in appointing Sir James Smollet to be their
commissioner," they instructed him "to declare their dis.,99
like of and dissent from the said union.
Such petitions and broadsides have focused undue atten
tion on the legislative session of 1706-07, wherein it has
been pictured that the balance on the question of union
96

Defoe, History of the Union of Grea.t Britain, p. 225.
.
97 James Mack.innon, The Union of England and Scotland
(Edinburgh, 1896), p. 26� Other titles included: "Scotland's
Interest" and "a Conference betwixt Mr. Con, Mr.· Pro and Mr.
Indifferent, concerning the Union."
98�- �- �-, XI, 311-96.

99
John Irving, History of Dumbartonshire (Dumbarton:
Bennett & Thomson, 1917), p.123 (extracted from the Dum
barton Burgh Records, October 4, 1706).
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could have been tipped either way when in truth, and for all
practical purposes, the issue had been decided on September 1,
1705, the date on which the Scottish Parli2�ent had ratified their willingness to negotiate.

Besides, there were

too many legislators with too much financially at stake for
.petitions and pamphlets to make a difference.

In any case,

it was soon discovered that the Opposition had engineered
much of the negative reaction in print and further antago
nized the majority in the legislature by organizing some.
. 1 .100
. th e capita
times unru1y demonstrat.ions in
Voting on the articles of the Treaty of Union began on
November 4, 1706, and continued until ratification on Jan
uary 16, 1707.

There were twenty-five articles in all,

each one considered individually.
with the mechanics of union:

The first articles dealt

the two kingdoms hereafter

were to be one under the designation of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain, with one monarch to descend from the House
of Hanover, a common flag and coinage, and a single Parlia

ment, which would sit at Westminster. 101

Scottish represen

tation in this new Parliament of Great Britain was·based on
a compromise between the ratio of taxable property and popu
lation, a formula which allowed the economically.depressed
northerners a mere sixteen peers to join the 190 English
100�- �- �-, XI, 369 and XI, 372.
lOlibid., XI, 418.
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peers in the House of Lords and forty-five commoners to join
the 513 already representing England and Wales in the lower
102
house.
These arrangements marked a definite victory for the
English, since their primary goal in pursuing union had
· been to regain control over North Britain.

For their part,

those in Scotland who had collaborated in the matter of the
Union realized that they had had little choice in the busi
ness, but some face was saved when the English conceded
that Scotland should retain her own Presbyterian Church,
laws, judicature and the particular privileges of the royal
burghs.
Of course, it was recognized that there would be tech
nical problems which would accompany the creation of the
new nation.

Adjustments in weights, measures, the coinage

and land taxes were engineered, and a process was developed
for the registration of Scottish vessels as British in
order that they might share in the benefits of England's
103
Some few concessions were made to the
colonial trade.
Scots in the areas of individual and collective rights.

Be

sides their national judicial system, the privileges of the

royal burghs, 104 and the preservation of the national Kirk,
102

.
Daic hes, Scotland and the Union, p. 131.

103�- P. �-, XI, 336 & 345.

.
l04 This
· was a relat.ive1y empty gesture given
the fact
that earlier, in 1672, the monopoly on international trade
enjoyed by the royal burghs had been terminated, though it
served as a warning to the English that they would not brook
the extent of English interference with their trade as they
had in the past. See above pp. 28-29.
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on a more individual basis, the heritable rights of the
greater lords and the private rights of all Scotsmen were
to be safeguarded as long as they did not conflict with
laws of the United Kingdom.105
Other provisions, too, were included for the Scots to
, make the idea of union more palatable, if not attractive.
Free trade was extended the Scots everywhere within the
United Kingdom, as well as in England's colonial markets.

106

The inclusion of this article was viewed as a victory for
Scotland's economy, especially in areas like linen manufac
ture which expected to profit from the expanded markets
·
.
l07 Another article
wh.ich par. the co 1 onies.
avai· 1able in
ticularly appealed to the northerners was a measure called
"the Equivalent."

This was a sum of money, �398,085 ster

ling, granted the Scots out of the English Treasury in com
pensation for their assumption of a share of the British
national debt.

Part of the Equivalent was also to be applied

as reimbursement, with five-percent interest, to those Scots

who had lost money in the Darien scheme.108

It was obvious

from contemporary accounts that the awarding of the Equiva
lent and of free trade was of great importance to Scotsmen
105A. P. S., XI, 354.
lOGibid., XI, 332.

l07Keith, The Commercial Relations of England and Scotland, p. 85.
108A.
P. §_ • I XI, 378.
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of the day.

The eminent contemporary historian Gilbert

Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury and a native of Edinburgh,
noted that "the desire on Darien . . . did now·engage many
to promote the union, who, without that consideration, wou ld
.
.
,,109
.
Sir
have been at 1east neutral , if
. not backward in it.
John Clerk, a member of the Scottish delegation which had
helped produce the Treaty of Union, emphasized the role of
trade:

"it was chiefly to obtain the benefite [of] the

plantations [that] the union was agreed to in Scotland . .
,, llO and the balloting of the members of the Estates
. ,
bears significant witness to the strong interest in all
matters of commerce.
Throughout the debates, on the Treaty of Union, the
Scottish House was split between the Court Party, with
roughly 115 votes, and the Opposition Party, with approxi111
mate1y eig
. h ty votes.
Balloting closely followed party
lines except on Articles IV, XV, and XXI, which dealt with
trade and related matters.

On Article IV, which bestowed

free trade upon all British subjects, only nineteen negative
109Gilbert Burnet, Bishop Burnet's History of His Own
Time (London: T. Davies of Russell-Street, 1766), I,180.
110
c1erk, Memoirs, pp. 53-54.

111Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, pp. 326-335.
The analysis ofvoting behavior is based on Professor Riley's
division of the Union Parliament into Court and Opposition
voting blo�s, although any actual counts given hav� been taken
directly from the A. P. S. Riley's information is based on
the politica l connections and previous voting records of the
members.
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votes were cast in the entire House:

ten nobles, eight bar-

ens, and a single burgess.

The rest of the Opposition
either abstained or voted for the measure.112 Even the
zealous Jacobite, George Lockhart of Carnwath, one of the
Scottish delegation who had opposed the Treaty of Vnion,
· showed his support of trade by assenting to the provision.
Overwhelming support attended the passage of the fif
teenth article, the Equivalent, which was only natural since
at least one quarter of the nobility and a sizeable propor
tion of the other Estates and the electorate had invested

113
in the Darien debacle and desired a return on their losses.
The twenty-first article, preserving the rights and privi
leges of the royal burghs, showed an even greater deviation
Out of the
. 114
almost 200 members who voted, a mere eight opposed it.
by the Opposition from their anti-union stance.

The examples of massive support for these commercial provi
sions of the treaty cannot be explained as the submission
of the Opposition to the inevitability of the compact's
passage, since the same Opposition doggedly opposed every
thing else in the document.

What is more likely was the

Opposition's determination, along with all patriotic Scots,
to demonstrate to the English that they would tolerate no
ll2A. P. S., XI, 332-334.
113James
s. Barbour, A History of William Patterson and
the Darien Company (Edinburgh: Bl�ckwood and Sons, 1909)-,
pp. 255-84.
114A. P. S., XI, 385.
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further tampering with Scottish trade.

In addition, as

practical men with their own hereditaments, burghs, pri
vate markets, and commercial investments to consider, they
were as anxious for profits as their colleagues in the ma
jority.
The wide�spread support for Articles IV,

xv,

and XXI

manifests, as nothing else, the fiscal and commercial con
cerns of the Union Parliament; and it was that broad support
within the legislature, drawn as it was from both ends of
the political spectrum, that convinced contemporaries and
historians that economic self-interest played the leading
role in securing passage of the Treaty of Union in Scotland.
A contending, and equally contemporary, explanation of Scot
tish motives suggests that union was carried entirely by
115 The
'
b ri. bery, and evi. d ence exists to support the i. dea.
Earl of Seafield, Chancellor of Scotland, recounts his suecess in winning over an Opposition foe:

"I wrote to my

Lord Montross . . . that since her Ma'ty understood him wil
ling to serve her, he might now declare his having a commission to be Lord High Admirall.

,.116

Andrew Fletcher,

the high-minded republican, expressed characteristic dismay
at the "great numbers of those who have the legislative
115P. H. Scott, 1707: The Union of Scotland and England
(Edinburgh: W. & R. Chambers Ltd., 1979), passim.-116James Ogilvy, Letters Relating to Scotland in the
Reign of Queen Anne, P. Hume Brown ed. (Edinburgh: Univer
sity Press, 19lsr;-pp. 34-35.
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authority" who received "the constant bribes of places and
pensions to betray thern; 11

117

while Bishop Burnett perhaps

stated the coemption theory best:

"those of Scotland had

learned from England, to set a price on their votes, and
they expected to be well paid for them.11118 However, to
say that Scotland's independence was bought is to overlook
the obvious.

Political management, involving extensive

patronage in addition to outright bribery, had been, and
still then was, an essential part of statecraft.

Politi

cians, especially when the issue was of national signifi
cance, expected to be bribed and generally accepted gratuities eagerly.

In the end, the bribery argument is weakened

by the ample evidence that the Opposition members of the
House were as handsomely paid for voting against the union
.
' 119
.
.
for it.
as its proponents were paid for voting
The most recent reappraisal of the union question, one
which denigrates the importance of commercial considerations
during the final balloting, holds that the members of the
Parliament of Scotland in the end voted their "private
117Andrew Fletcher, The Political Works of Andrew
Fletcher, Esq.
(London: � Bettesworth and C. Hitch, in
Paternoster-Row, 1732), p. 77.
llS Burnet, H'is tory �
f His
. 0wn Tim
. e, I, 181.

119Mackinnon, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 354.
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political ambitions.11120

This fits well the political en

vironment of the time and emphasizes again the considerable
role of Westminster.

Scottish politicians, so runs the

argument, aware of the inevitability of union, and eager for
preferment from the new government of

Great Britain,

sought to ingratiate themselves with the brokers of power
in the south by voting for union.
It is a skillful thesis, not at all without merit.
Doubtless, there were Scots who were moved by such considerations.
vious.

But the argument, aqain, makes light of the ob-

Granting that there were many factors which led the

Scottish legislature to accept union, even when their country
men were passionately against it, it fails to consider suf
ficiently the fact that, desiring union, England had sufficient force to compel it.

In fact, through the threat of

the Alien Act, England had compelled it.

She had no

need of bribes or promises of preferment, thouqh they
were offered by way of hastening the surrender of Scotland.

In and of itself, the Alien Act, which threatened the

economic annihilation of the country and all additional
sorrows that might have come from that, was all the induce
ment from England that Scotland politicians needed.
120Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, p. xvi.
William Ferguson concurs with this interpretation in Chap
ter 14 of Anglo-Scottish Relations: A Survey to 1707.

\·
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Taking Scotland's economic susceptability into account,
the question of whether or not the Scots desired union be
comes almost irrelevant;

The English, to secure the Hano

verian succession and to shut that proverbial back door
into their nation through which so many troublesome invaders
had slipped, were determined that Scotland would be bridled.
In this sense, Scottish motivation for union can be seen
as negative in that, to avoid further hurt from an ancient
enemy who had been an incessant source of injury, believing
that she lacked the wherewithal to further resist, what her
soul resisted her stomach at last accepted.
Positive motivations for union, among them the desire
for office in the new government to be formed, free trade
everywhere within the English sphere of influence, and the
assurance of a Protestant succession, would have been the
overriding factors to be considered, if the Estates of
Parliament had been left to decide the merits of union for
themselves.

However, the Alien Act deprived the Scottish

legislature of that independence in the decision-making
process, so that the actual votes on the twenty-five articles
of the Treaty of Union can only indicate the factional align
ments or popular interests which may have prevailed had the
shadow of the Alien Act not prevaded the whole process.
Be t�at as it may, what might have been is not the con
cern of this paper.

Rather, by way of summation and conclu

sion, let it be said that while it would be rash to assume
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that commerce was the only motivation to prompt passage of
the Treaty of Union, other considerations pale before it.
The plight of the Scot and his economic vulnerability to
English pressure was never far from the minds of the members
of the Union Parliament, even when deliberating on points
of a non-commercial nature.

William Seton, laird of Pit

medden in Aberdeenshire, upon introduction of the first
article of the treaty, to join Scotland and England in a
United Kingdom of Great Britain, urged adopti0n of the same,
using as his argument what was no more than a self-evident
truth:

"The people and government of Scotland must be

richer or poorer, as they have plenty or scarcity of money,
the common measure of trade,

[but] no money or things of

value can be purchased in the course of commerce but where
.,121 Political union,
there is force to protect it.
then, had long since come to be viewed by the men of influ
ence in ·scotland as the only remedy to the imbalance of
power, especially economic, which had caused so many difficulties under the personal union of cro¼�s.

It, at least,

was the only remedy which the English would allow.
With the nation in turmoil, the legislature at Edin
burgh House proceded apace with its own suicide.

Debates

on the articles, which had begun on October 12, 1706, were
terminated with the passage of the Treaty of Union on
.
121Quoted in
. Defoe, H'istory o f the Union of Great
Britain, p. 315.
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January 16, 1707.

One hundred and ten votes carried the

day with sixty-seven members in opposition and the remain
ing thirteen abstaining.

On March 19, the Union Parlia

ment adjourned; it would never meet again; and on May 1,

as a result of Westminster's ratification of the Act of

Union, the kingdoms of Scotland and England ceased alike

to exist and were incorporated in a United Kingdom of
Great Britain.122

122Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 1.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
· Brown, P. Hume, ed. The Register of the Privy Council of
Scotland. 3rd ser. Edinburgh-,- 1915.
Burnet, Gilbert. Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time.
4 vols. London: T. Davies of Russell-StreeS-1766.
Clerk, Sir John. Memoirs of the Life of Sir John Clerk of
Penicuik. John Gray,ed-:-Edinburgh:-----;_f. and A. Con=
stable, 1892.
Defoe, Daniel. The History of the Union Between England
and Scotlancr:- London: John Stockdale, 1786.
Fletcher, Andrew. The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher,
Esq. London:� Bettesworth and C Hitch, in Pater
oster-Row, 1732.
Fountainhall, Lord, ed. Decisions of the Lords of Council
and Session. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1683-87.
Ogilvy, James. Letters Relating to Scotland in the Reign
of Queen Anne by James Ogilvy, First Earl of Seafield,
and Other_s___p _
_ _ Hume Brown, ed. Edinburgh:-University
Press, 1915.
Thomson, Thomas, and Cosmo Innes, ed's. The Acts of the
Parliament of Scotland. 12 vols. Edinburgh, 1814-75.
Secondary Sources
Barbour, James S. A History of William Patterson artd the
Darien Cornpany:- Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1.909.
Brown, P. Hume. The Legislative Union of England and Scot
land. Oxforcr:- Clarendon Press, 1914.
Campbell, R. H. "The Law and the Joint-Stock Company in
Scotland." In Studies in Scottish Business Historv.
Peter L. Payne, ed. London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966,
pp. 136-51.
Daiches, David.. Scotland and the Union.
1977.

London:

John Murray,

61

D evin�, T. M. "The Social Composition of the Business Class
in the Larger Scottish Towns, 1680-1740." In Ireland
and Scotland, 1600-1850. T. M. Devine and 0:- Dickson
ed's. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983. '
Donaldson, Gordon, Scotland: The Shaping of a Nation.
London: David & Charles,--ygso.
D unbar-Dunbar, Edward.
burgh: Edmonston

&

Social Life in Former Days.
Dougla�846.

Edin

Ferguson, William. Scotland's Relations with England: A
Survey to 1707. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers
Ltd., 1977-.-Gardiner, S. R.
tectorate.

History of the Commonwealth and the Pro4 vols. New York: AMS Press--;--Ync:-;- 1965.

Insh, G. P. The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and
the Indies.'"" London,1932.
Irving, John. History of Dumbartonshire.
Bennett and Thomson, 1917.

Dumbarton:

Keith, Theodora. The Commercial Relations of England and
Scotland, 1603=T707. Cambridge, 1910.
--------"Influence of the Convention of the Royal Burqhs
of Scotland on the Economic Development of Scotland
before 1707." Scottish Historical Review, X (1912),
250-71.
"The Trading Privileges of the Royal Burghs of
---------Scotland." Enqlish Bisto1'."ical Rev.i.ew, 28 ( 1913), 45 471 & 678-90.

Lenman, Bruce. An Economic History of Modern Scotland.
Hamden, ct.: Shoe String Press-,- 1977.

Lythe, s. G. E. and J. Butt. An Economic History of Scot
land, 1100-1939. Glasgow: John Donald Publishers Ltd.,
1975.
Mackinnon, James. The Union of England and Scotland. Edin
burgh, 1896.
Marshall, Gordon. Presbyteries _and_Profits, Calvinism and
nd, 1560-17o'?-:the Development of Capitalism in Scotla
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

�-=------------------···
62
Marwick, J. D.
Maclehose

The River Clyde! the Clyde Burghs.
and Sone, 1909.

Mitchis on, Rosalind.
Methuen, 1982.

A History of Scotland.

Glasgow:

2nd ed. London:

Pryde, G. S. Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day.
York: Thomas Nelsonand Son� 1962.

New

-----

The Treaty of Union of Scotland and England, 1707.
London: Nelson-,- 1950.

Rait, R . S. A History of Scotland.
worth Ltd., 1914. -

-----The Parliaments of Scotland.
Jackson & Co., 1924.

London:

Thornton Butter

Glasgow:

Maclehose,

Ril ey, P. W. J. The Union of Enqland and Scotland.
chester: Manchester University Press, 1978.

Man-

Rogers, Charles. Social Life in Scotland.
rpt. London: Kennikat Press, 1971.

1884;

2 vols.

Scott, P. H. 1707: The Union of Scotland and Enqland.
Edinburgh: W. & R.ChambersLtd., 1979.
Smout, T. C. "The Glasgow Merchant Community in the Seven
teenth Century." Scottish Historical Review, XLVII,
(1968).

-------

A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830.
York: CharlesScribner's Sons, 1969.

New

Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707.
Edinburgh: Oliver &Boyd,-rg6}-:-

Thompson, Willie. "Reformation to Union." In Scottish
from
Nation, -Capitalism: Class
State and
- before the
-- -cc----=----'-' --Union to the Present. Tony Dickson, ed. London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1980.

Trevelyan, G. M. Ramillies and the Union with Scotland.
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1934.
Whyte, Ian. Aqriculture and Society in Seventeenth Century
Scotland. Edinburgh_:_John Donald Publishers Ltd.,
1974.

